We investigate the recruitment into the upper class, analysing the impact of different forms of capital and modes of closure. Unlike many Bourdieu-influenced approaches to class, we systematically investigate divisions by composition of capital: the relative weight of economic to cultural capital. We find capital-specific barriers to mobility: Access to the upper classes is not only differentiated by one's parents' volume of capital or the general class hierarchy, but also by the relative weight of cultural to economic capital. Drawing on theories of social closure, we further investigate the role of two distinct modes of closure -credentialism and private property. The degree of closure differs significantly between subfractions of the upper class, based on the degree to which they refer to positions involving specific credential requirements. Our findings underline the importance of capital composition, but also that closure operates by neither credentials nor property alone. In the present paper, we push this line of research further by analysing how inherited economic and cultural capital are shaping recruitment to upper class fractions, and how these intersect with educational credentialization and private property as two distinct modes of closure (Parkin 1979, Murphy 1988.
With the staggering increase in inequalities of recent years (Atkinson and Morelli 2014) In the present paper, we push this line of research further by analysing how inherited economic and cultural capital are shaping recruitment to upper class fractions, and how these intersect with educational credentialization and private property as two distinct modes of closure (Parkin 1979 , Murphy 1988 .
We see class divisions as manifested in the distribution of forms of capital (Savage, Warde, and Devine 2005) . While it is widely recognized that economic, cultural and social resources are of great significance for understanding how class 'works' (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, and Payne 1987:99, Khan 2012) , it is with Bourdieu's perspective that they come to be seen as the most 'determinant property' of social class (Bourdieu 1984: 106, see the discussion in Flemmen 2013) . But unlike recent attempts at applying Bourdieu's ideas in class analysis, like the GBCS, we operationalize the class structure as two-dimensional, shaped by both the total amount of capital, but also the composition of this capital -the relative weight of economic to cultural capital (see Flemmen et al. forthcoming) . We therefore distinguish four main hierarchical levels of the class structure -working class, lower middle class, upper 4/34 middle class and upper class. We then differentiate the upper and middle groups into fractions by the type of capital, so that each is split into a cultural-capital fraction, an economic-capital fraction and a fraction with a balanced mix.
While most approaches to social stratification emphasize the significance of education, class analysis stresses the role of private property (Flemmen 2013) : Marxians see class as anchored in relations of production (Wright 2005) , whereas Weberians see the divide between the propertied and the property-less as the basic fault line in the class structure (Breen 2005) .
But education or property should not be an either/or choice, so we move beyond this dichotomy by drawing on theories of social closure: 'In modern capitalist society the two main exclusionary devices by which the bourgeoisie constructs and maintains itself as a class are, first, those surrounding the institutions of private property; and, second, academic or professional qualifications and credentials' (Parkin 1979:47-8) . While the upper class as such might rely on both, its different fractions might rely on them to different degrees and in different combinations. To explore this, we distinguish between subfractions by their degree of credentialization -the extent to which access to the relevant positions is regulated by specific educational credentials -and whether access is regulated without such educational requirements, giving more leeway to the role of property through inheritance or other forms of intergenerational advantage. We use Norwegian administrative register data with comprehensive information on the entire population. Upper class positions are measured in the period 2003-2012 for individuals born 1955-1964 (n=609,499) .
Upper classes and social closure
While class and stratification is a staple of contemporary sociology, there are too few studies of recruitment into the upper class. Indeed, the upper class -and in particular the propertyowning capitalists -has virtually vanished from most approaches to class structure. This is 5/34 striking, given the centrality of the property dimension to both Marx (1976) and Weber (1978:926-32) , who continue to serve as inspiration for contemporary accounts of class. In Goldthorpe's approach, now the basis of the official measure of class in the UK and the EU (Rose and Harrison 2010, Rose and Pevalin 2003) , proprietors are lumped in with the broad upper middle class (Goldthorpe 1982, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993) . Erikson and Goldthorpe argue that large-scale proprietors today are organisations and corporations, rather than individuals, and individual capitalists have become so few that they are obsolete in surveybased analyses (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993 (Bourdieu 1984 (Bourdieu , 1986 . Capital refers to any kind of competence or possession that is in short supply, unequally distributed and which is valued in some 'market' or social field, so that it may come to constitute an advantage for its holder. Economic capital refers to money, wealth or 'the indirect mastery … of financial resources' (Bourdieu 2005: 194) . Cultural capital refers to cultural competences, either in the embodied sense of mastery of valued lifestyles or in the institutionalized sense of educational credentials (Bourdieu 1986) . The latter becomes a capital largely through its value in labour markets, whereas the former becomes an asset through the positive or negative evaluation it is subject to, not least within the school system (Andersen and Hansen 2011) .
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Unlike much work in class analysis, we build on Bourdieu's recognition that these forms of capital might not add up one-dimensionally. Recognizing the different institutional bases of power, we operationalize Bourdieu's concept of a capital composition: within the same hierarchical level of the class structure, actors are differentiated according to the relative weight of cultural to economic capital in their overall holdings. Thus, the upper class is comprised of the most powerful actors from diverse fields -business, politics, academia, arts, etc. -and in practice measured as the actors richest in economic and cultural capital.
The theory of social closure was developed by Parkin (1979) , drawing on Weber (1978: 43ff, 302ff, 336ff) to account for 'how collectives seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles' (Parkin 1979:44) . Parkin maintained that the modern bourgeoisie relies on two distinct modes of social closure: private property and the educational system. Private property restricts access to the means of production, and in a more general sense confers market privileges through money, while credential requirements limit access to key positions in the social division of labour. Parkin placed a particular focus on how the different modes of closure were implicated in the social reproduction of the upper class. He diagnosed a 'permanent tension within this class resulting from the need to legitimate itself by preserving openness of access, and the desire to reproduce itself socially by resort to closure on the basis of descent' (Parkin 1979:47) .
Some authors have argued that contemporary capitalism has undergone a shift from the family-based mode of class reproduction to a school-mediated form: the rise of impersonal property -join stock enterprises, institutional shareholdings, etc. -is seen as giving rise to a more prominent role to credentials and cultural resources in upper class reproduction (Bourdieu 1996 , Scott 1997 . But the different fractions of the upper classes might rely on these modes of closure to different extents and in different ways (see Flemmen 2012) .
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However, the extent of credential closure, or the extent of closure by direct inheritance of property and more indirect in terms of economic advantages, could vary depending on the precise upper class positions in question.
Elites in the Norwegian class structure
While systematic studies of upper-class recruitment are few and far between, there are some studies of recruitment to different upper class positions. Earlier research found the Norwegian business elite, as well as the economic upper class more generally, to be disproportionally recruited from the upper class (Flemmen 2009 , Gulbrandsen et al. 2002 , Mastekaasa 2004 .
Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting increased social closure: 'having parents from the top echelons of wealth has, over time, become more important for reaching the highest levels of wealth' oneself (Hansen 2014:477) . (Hansen 2001 , Strømme and Hansen, 2017 . However, in many western societies, political elites have been found to be more accessible and egalitarian than administrative elites (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981) .
The cultural fraction of the upper class is much less studied, and indeed, not often recognized as a distinct class fraction (but see Ljunggren 2015 Ljunggren , 2016 . The Norwegian cultural upper class has been found to be strongly marked by self-recruitment and 8/34 characterized by underrepresentation of lower-class progeny (Ljunggren 2010). Indeed, the cultural upper class is found to be slightly more self-recruiting than the economic or the balanced fraction. Moreover, the probability of experiencing downward mobility is lowest among those with parents rich in cultural capital, compared to those with rich in economic capital (Hjellbrekke and Korsnes 2010).
These studies unveil class-based reproduction that extends beyond the economic sphere. However, a systematic and integrated mapping of recruitment patterns into the top segments of the class structure has yet to surface. Moreover, there is almost no research on the different modes of closure facilitating reproduction in different segments of the upper class.
The present study aims to make good on these shortcomings, providing the first analyses to allow direct comparison of the degree of closure of the different upper class fractions. We also provide the first attempt at illuminating the differences in intergenerational reproduction associated with different modes of closure.
The foregoing leads to the following expectations. First, we expect some degree of class-fraction reproduction, so that the highest odds or probabilities of obtaining a position in an upper class fraction should pertain to originating in the same class fraction. Second, we expect that, for those not born into the upper class, the chances of joining the upper class should increase with parents' volume of capital. Children of the lower middle class should have higher chances than children of the working class; children of the upper middle class should have higher chances than children of the lower middle class, etc. Third, we expect horizontal differences: differentiation of chances by the composition of capital, so that it would be more probable for someone from the cultural fraction of the lower middle class to enter the cultural fraction of the upper class than it would be for someone originating the economic fraction of the lower middle class to do the same. Fourth, we expect varying degrees of closure -operationalized in terms of the effect of parental class -by 9/34 credentialization, i.e., by the extent to which access to positions depend on formal educational requirements.
Theories of credentialism foster expectations of stronger intergenerational closure in groups with strong credentialization. However, capitalist market economies entail a generalised value of property in general and money in particular, so that economic resources should also prove influential within subfractions with low credentialization. That would suggest social closure also in these groups. Parental resources, such as wealth, might itself constitute what has been referred to as a 'cushion' or 'insurance', which can facilitate the undertaking of risky ventures -or pursuing careers with unclear and/or uncertain prospects. It has for instance, been found that individuals who receive an inheritance are more likely to set up a business (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998) , and parental wealth affects mobility chances more generally (Pfeffer and Hällsten 2012) . By the same token, both access to, and success within, artistic occupations are highly affected by individuals' economic security (Friedman, O'Brien, and Laurison 2016, Ljunggren 2016) . Thus, we hypothesize that even groups with low credentialization might exhibit a considerable degree of closure owing to the effects of private property. This could be the case for both self-employed, proprietors and rentiers (SPR); politicians as well as artists. To pursue a career in any of these subfractions may be seen as risky ventures where success requires long-term investments and having the possibility to, at least temporarily get by on a modest personal income. We expect those with less capital in the family to pursue these kinds of careers less often.
Data and methods
Our research design involves two crucial steps. First, we conceptualize social class divisions in terms of both volume and composition of capital for respondents and their parents. This lets us assess the degree of intergenerational self-recruitment in different classes and fractions.
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Second, we subdivide upper class fractions into subfractions based on their degree of credentialization. Within each fraction, we distinguish between sets of positions with clear and consistent credential requirements (professions, academics, and, arguably to a lesser extent, business professionals) from those with no such requirements (artists, politicians, selfemployed/proprietors/rentiers) -and a middle category for positions in which credentials are sometimes or often required for access (cultural directors, top bureaucrats, chief executives). This lets us assess the effect of social class origin on recruitment into these nine subfractions, so that we can compare the degree of closure between groups with differing regulations of access.
For this, we exploit Norwegian administrative register data that provide information on the entire Norwegian population born in 1955 onwards. These data comprise official registers on tax, employment and education, and ensures reliable information on income, occupation, and education. The authorities gather this data routinely for taxation purposes, as well as demographic surveying and official statistics, and they are administered by Statistics Norway. We can also link individuals to their parents, so that class origins can be determined.
This data is unique in that it allows us to study very exclusive social groups which would only be represented by a handful of individuals in ordinary representative surveys. 1 We use a novel operationalization of class inspired by the work of Bourdieu. The Oslo Register Data Class Scheme distinguishes classes and class fractions in two dimensions.
2 It has first, a hierarchical dimension of the total amount of capital: it differentiates the highest from the lowest classes. In this hierarchy, class positions reflect the total volume of cultural and economic capital. We thereby identify four main classes: the upper, the upper-middle, the lower middle and the working class -as well as one category for those employed in the 1 Migrants with missing information on either parental class (immigration) or adult class (emigration) are naturally omitted from the analyses. However, this applies to only about 1 per cent of the upper class. Excluding migrants from the analysis makes almost no difference. Results can be obtained upon request.
2 Syntax for the construction of the class scheme can be obtained from the authors.
11/34 primary sector and one category for people whose livelihoods depend on welfare transferences. But cross-cutting this is the second dimension of capital composition. We differentiate the three highest classes into cultural and economic fractions, as well as balanced fractions, conceptualised as having roughly similar amounts of economic and cultural capital.
The scheme is operationalized by classifying occupational titles, but is supplemented with information of income from the tax registers. We use the overall level of income to distinguish between levels in the economic fractions: the upper, the upper middle and the lower middle economic class fractions are distinguished by their relative income -as a proxy for their volume of economic capital. Second, we use information on capital gains and income from self-employment to identify rentiers or capitalists among respondents without occupational codes and place these in one of the economic class fractions, depending on their level of income. Third, we use information on welfare transferences to identify those whose level of such transferences exceeds what they earn from other sources, placing them in the category for welfare transference dependants. Fourth, we assign those whose income derives mostly from farming, fisheries and forestry to the category 'primary sector'. The resultant scheme is shown in Figure 1 .
The outcome variables in the subsequent analyses concern the likelihood of recruitment into the Norwegian upper class fractions ( Figure 1 ) and their internal subfractions.
We analyse the complete 1955-1964 cohorts and measure these cohorts' class position at an age where they are believed to be close to the apex of their careers, that is: at age 48, 
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The second outcome variable concerns the divisions by credentialization. We have split each class fraction into three subfractions -with high, medium or low/no credentialization. With this we aim to get at the degree to which access to the relevant class positions is regulated by credentials. These subdivisions are illustrated in Figure and women, our model includes an interaction term between class origin and gender. As each cohort is measured at age 48 -and therefore at different time periods -dummy variables for each year are also included. 7 Descriptive statistics for all variables in the analyses are provided in Table 1 . Table 2 shows coefficients (logit) estimating the association between parental class and the likelihood of obtaining a position in any of the three upper class fractions versus any other class position. 8 Social origin in the unskilled working class is the reference category for the independent variable. Table 2 Further, such capital-specific mobility patterns are also evident among the progeny of the upper middle class; these associations are systematically higher for access into upper class fractions that match the capital profile of parental upper middle class origins. This is especially evident in the cultural fraction, where we also find the highest level of capitalspecific closure. The strongest tendency for closure is detected in the relative likelihood of becoming self-employed/proprietor/rentier. The odds of women originating in the economic upper class becoming an SPR are 42 times higher than women from the unskilled working class. Here, gender differences are striking; the corresponding figure for men is 13. Indeed, for each upper-class origin, the relative association between origin and becoming an SPR is significantly and substantively larger for women in comparison to men. This indicates that the women who do make it into these positions are very strongly selected in terms of social class. In Figure 5 , we present predicted probabilities for accessing each upper class fraction for men and women originating in the different fractions of the upper class. Although class origins appear more important for women than for men, the predicted probabilities for accessing each upper class fraction testify to the male dominance of these groups: overall, men enjoy significantly larger probabilities for entering the upper class, regardless of class origins. Within the balanced and economic fraction men have significantly and substantively larger probabilities of accessing power than women. It is, in fact, only in recruitment to the cultural upper class that gender differences seem insignificant. This is especially glaring in the economic upper class, whose sons enjoy dramatically higher chances of joining its ranks than its daughters.
Results

Conclusion
Our analysis documents a considerable degree of upper class reproduction, relatively stable in the period studied, in line with our first expectation. Being born to upper-class parents yield superior chances of becoming upper class one self. In addition to the direct class reproduction, we find a differentiation of the chances of entering the upper class by two dimensions, in relation to both the volume and composition of parents' capital. The chances increase the further up in the class system one was born and the overall more capital the family held, as our second expectation postulated. Our third expectation concerned limitations on horizontal mobility, which was supported by our finding that the form of capital also differentiates the 
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Bourdieu expected the composition of capital to constitute an important axis of class differentiation in most advanced capitalist societies. He found capital-specific forms of closure, similar to our findings, using material from 1970 (Bourdieu 1984:121) . Savage and colleagues recalculated figures from Goldthorpe to show similar types of capital-specific mobility closure at work within the 'service class' in the UK (Savage et al. 1992:137-8) , at least in 1970s. Although it cannot simply be assumed that this applies equally to all advanced capitalist societies, our analysis demonstrates the significance of both capital volume and composition and the differentiation of mobility chances around it. It is evident that these patterns would have been partly underestimated and partly undetected with a conventional measure of social class, such as the Goldthorpe scheme or its officially sanctioned offshoots.
Its top category, 'service class', lumps together a series of positions that are very different in terms of both the volume of capital -in that they it does not distinguish between the upper class and the upper middle -and the composition of capital (Flemmen 2014) . 
